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A Return to States' Rights? The Rehnquist
Court Revives Federalism
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court ended the 1997 Term with the declaration that
Congress exceeded its power when it enacted three recent laws.1 The Court
stated that Congress cannot "commandeer" a local sheriff to execute a federal law,2 that Congress cannot pass a law that effectively overturns a prior
Supreme Court decision3 and that Congress cannot regulate the transmission
of obscene or indecent material on the Internet. 4 The question arises of
whether these decisions signal a fundamental shift by the Court toward a
new era of federalism.5 Perhaps to answer this question and to underscore
the point, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in Printz v. United States, the case
that invalidated part of the Brady Gun Law, that liberty was best protected
and the "risk of tyranny" best avoided by preserving "a healthy balance of
power between the states and the federal government. '' 6

1. In the term that ended in July, 1997, the Supreme Court overturned three federal
laws: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993); the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 133
(1996); and the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, Title I, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993).
2. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). The Court invalidated the portion
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which commanded state and local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers for
an interim period until a national instant background check system becomes operative. See
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, Title I, 107 Stat. 1536.
3. The Supreme Court ruled in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied
to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest. Many
members of Congress criticized this ruling and passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
to essentially overrule the Smith decision. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157,
2161 (1997).
4. The Communications Decency Act prohibits the knowing transmission of obscene
or indecent messages over the Internet to anyone under the age of 18. Communications
Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 133 (1996); See Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (finding Act invalid).
5. See Ralph A. Rossum, Power to the States. The Supreme Court's Defense of
Federalism, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., July 23, 1997, at B5 ("In its recent decisions, the
court has accelerated the shift of power to the states and away from the national government.").
6. 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
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Is it the case then that these decisions solidify a recent trend toward
increased states' rights? Or is it that these decisions are examples of an
activist Court's reaction to its frustration with the expansion of congressional
power?7 This Comment examines the three decisions in which the Court
invalidated an act of Congress: Printz v. United States,8 City of Boerne v.
Flores9 and Reno v. ACLU."° In two of the cases, Printz" and City of
Boerne'2, the Court indicated that Congress exceeded its powers and
infringed on the autonomy of the states. In Reno v. ACLU, 13 the Court
stated that Congress is barred by the First Amendment from regulating
speech on the Internet. 4 Part I examines judicial activism and the period
in history when the Court last placed significant restrictions on Congress'
power to legislate, the New Deal era of the early 1930s.' s The subsequent
move by the Court after 1937 toward increased deference to Congress will
also be examined.' 6 Part II examines cases that have been decided since
the New Deal. The cases from the 1970s and the 1980s represent the
Court's fluctuating interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. 7 The most
recent cases, however, illustrate the Court's shift toward a new dynamic, one
which reins in the power of Congress and affords increased deference to the

7. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1087
(1995) (arguing that the Court's antagonism toward congressional commandeering of state
officers is "driven by attitude, not analysis").
8. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
9. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
10. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
11. .117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
12. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
13. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
14. The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. See Reno,
117 S. Ct. at 2334.
15. When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected, the country was faced with serious
economic problems. Congress attempted to solve the nation's woes with broad, sweeping
legislation that was constitutionally questionable. See Richard A. Maidment, The Judicial
Response to the New Deal 56 (Manchester Univ. Press, 1991) ("In those early days of the
New Deal, both President Roosevelt and his advisors were preoccupied with recovery and
were not concerned with what they saw were constitutional niceties.").
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). This was the
first major case to test the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The Supreme Court upheld
the power of Congress to regulate intrastate activities that had an effect on interstate
commerce.
17. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); See
also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (reviving the states' rights doctrine
by holding that there are essential attributes of state sovereignty that cannot be infringed
upon by the Federal government). Garcia essentially overturned Usery ten years later.
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autonomy of the states.' 8 Part III examines in detail the cases decided
during the 1997 term and concludes that although the Court may not be
standing on solid constitutional ground with its recent decisions, its activist
majority does envision a new federalism. 9
I. THE NEW DEAL
A. EARLY "NEW DEAL" CASES

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that,
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."20 The Framers, by drafting this amendment, sought to assure
that the power of the federal government was limited and the sovereignty of
the states was protected. 2' However, at various points in history, Supreme
Court decisions have often curtailed or enlarged the power of the federal
government. Often these limitations or expansions correspond more with
the prevailing economic or philosophical theories entertained by the Justices
than by strict constitutional doctrine.2 2 With this process, the Tenth
Amendment has been reduced to almost nothing23 only to be revived in
later cases when economic or philosophical opinions change.24

18. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); See also New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In both these cases, the Supreme Court limits the Federal
government's power to regulate in what the Court believes are traditional state areas.
19. David Strauss, Law Professor at the University of Chicago and editor of the
Supreme Court Review stated, "what we saw this term in the Supreme Court was the court
striking down recently enacted, popular, major pieces of legislation, sometimes in two
instances admitting that there was nothing explicit in the Constitution that required them to
do it." Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, July 2, 1997).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
21. See Anthony B. Ching, Traveling Down the Unsteady Path: UnitedStates v. Lopez,
New York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 99 (1995).
22. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213-14 (1996).
23. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court stated, in regard to
the Tenth Amendment, "there is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was
more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments." Id.
at 124.
24. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court stated that
"the Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in
a federal system." Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
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Congress has historically utilized the Commerce Clause25 to expand
Tenth Amendment power. The Supreme Court allows the use of the
Commerce Clause when the Court determines that Congress is within its
constitutional bounds and outlaws the use of the Commerce Clause when
Congress treads into what the Justices feel are traditional state functions.26

When President Roosevelt issued a call for action in order to deal with the

economic crisis in the early 1930s,27 it was the Commerce Clause that
Congress looked to when enacting sweeping legislation.2" However, when
the challenges to this New Deal legislation reached the Court, the Court
swiftly rebuffed Congress for exceeding its powers and invalidated one law
after another.2 9
One of the first decisions in which the Court crippled the New Deal
30
was its decision in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.
This case dealt with a challenge to the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934,31
an act which established a compulsory retirement and pension system for
railroad carriers. 32 Although Congress had in the past regulated the
railroad industry,33 the Court ruled that Congress exceeded its Commerce
Clause powers when passing this Act. The Court stated that, "though we
should think the measure embodies a valuable social plan and be in entire
sympathy with its purpose and intended results, if the provisions go beyond

the boundaries of constitutional power we must so declare.

34

Critics,

25. Congress shall have the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
26. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruledby United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court stated that the Tenth Amendment barred Congress
from usurping traditional state powers. Id. at 274.
27. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115 (Foundation Press, 12th ed.
1991) ("President Roosevelt took office in 1933 in the midst of a grave economic crisis and
with a call for 'action, and action now."').
28. Id.
29. Id. at 116.
30. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
31. The Railroad Retirement Act was not a product of the Roosevelt administration,
but he nevertheless signed it because it was "in line with the social policy of the Administration." Maidment, supra note 15, at 71 (quoting R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL

SUPREMACY

104 (1941)).

32. Congress felt that the Act was needed to boost morale in the railroad industry.
Morale was low because of the financial insecurity of the railroad carriers and the inadequacy
of their pension plans. Id. at 72.
33. See, e.g., Southern R.R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
34. Alton, 295 U.S. at 346.
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however, charged that this was the act of an activist Court majority that was
hostile to reform.35
Another blow to the New Deal came only a few weeks after the Alton
decision when the Court announced its decision in A.L.A Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States. 36 The Schechter case concerned the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 which authorized industry codes that
covered such things as unfair trade practices, wages, maximum hours and
collective bargaining. The Court found this Act to be beyond Congress'
Commerce Clause power.3' Again the Court was unwilling to consider the
economic crisis gripping the country. Echoing the sentiment from Alton that
valuable social plans are not a justification for enlarging the sphere of
"[e]xtraordinary conditions do
constitutional authority, the Court stated that,
'3
not create or enlarge constitutional power. 1
The Court appeared to solidify its opposition to New Deal legislation
when, following Schechter, it ruled against the Bituminous Coal Act of 1935
Despite the fact that the
in the case of Carter v. Carter Coal CO.39
government had a strong argument that this legislation dealt with interstate
Further, the Court asserted
commerce, the Court invalidated the Act.'
.itself as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution by stating:
[A] judicial tribunal, clothed by that instrument with
complete judicial power, and, therefore, by the very nature
of the power, required to ascertain and apply the law to
the facts in every case or proceeding properly brought for

35. See Gunther, supra note 27, at 116. See also Daniel Novak, Economic Activism
SUPREME COURT ACTIvIsM AND RESTRAINT, 77, 91 (Stephen C. Halpern
and Charles M. Lamb, eds., 1982) ("The Court's attack was, therefore, widely seen as
judicial arrogance of the first water, and a direct challenge to the democratic process.").
36. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37. The Schechter case resulted from convictions for violating wage and hour
provisions of the "Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan
[New York City] Area." See Gunther, supra note 27, at 117. Schechter's market bought and
sold chicken locally. For this reason, the government had difficulty arguing to the Court that
this was interstate commerce. Id. at 117.
38. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 528. 'The Court stated that, "such assertions of
extraconstitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth
Amendment." Id. at 529.
39. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Following the defeat of the NIRA in Schechter, Roosevelt
urged the passage of a regulatory act for the coal industry. See Gunther, supra note 27, at
119.
40. See Novak, supra note 35, at 92.

and Restraint, in
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adjudication, must apply the supreme law and reject the
inferior statute whenever the two conflict.4 '
The New Deal Court was considered activist because it put its belief
in dual federalism and states' rights over the social or economic effects of
its decisions. 42 The Court had its own anti-regulatory agenda and wanted
to limit federal interference into local economic areas.4 3 The Court was
concerned with the sovereignty of the states and chose to hold its ideal of
this sovereignty above the possible serious economic ramifications of its
decisions."4 The opinion in Carter Coal has been described as striking a
blow to "American nationalism" such that "it has seldom, if ever, received. ' 45
The opinion, it has been said, denied that the Constitution
"contained within its grants any authority for meeting the most serious of
6
the problems facing the nation in 1936."
B. THE MOVE AWAY FROM STATES' RIGHTS

On March 9, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed the
American public on a plan to reorganize the federal judiciary. President
Roosevelt talked about the refusal of the Supreme Court to support his plans
for economic reform. 47 He also spoke of the Court as a "super-legislature"
that read into the Constitution "words and implications which were not there
and which were never intended to be there. ' 48 Roosevelt's plan was to
pack the Court by nominating a new Justice for each Justice over seventy
years of age who had not yet retired. 49 Although this plan was rejected by
Congress, the change in the attitude of the Supreme Court was swift.5"
The Court, in subsequent decisions, abandoned its ideal of dual federalism

41.

Carter, 298 U.S. at 296.

42. See Novak, supra note 35, at 92 ("The bulk of the Court's activism had been
exhausted upon the national government's regulatory legislation, and often the rationale for
those decisions had been a professed solicitude for the sovereignty of the states.").
43. See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 2214.
44. See Maidment, supra note 15, at 123.
45. Id. (quoting

198 (1951)).

J. Paschal, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN

46. Id.

AGAINST THE STATE

47. President Roosevelt stated, "the courts, however, have cast doubts on the ability
of the elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern
social and economic conditions." Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary (March 9, 1937).
48. Id.
49. See Gunther, supra note 27, at 122.
50. See Novak, supra note 35, at 93.
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and economic due process and began awarding more deference to Congress. 5
52
The move by the Court from judicial activism to judicial restraint is
apparent in its decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." In that
decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935"' which guaranteed the rights of employees to
By
organize labor unions and bargain collectively with employers."
power
Congress'
to
deference
great
afforded
Court
upholding this Act the
of regulation under the Commerce Clause by stating that legislation is
56
constitutional if Congress can merely establish a reasonable basis for it.
57
This deference to the legislature continued in United States v. Darby
when the Court stated that the power of Congress over interstate commerce
"extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce."58 Further, the Court dealt a crippling blow to its ideal of state
sovereignty by stating that the Tenth Amendment did not serve as a restraint
on Congressional power and was nothing more than "declaratory of the
relationship between the national and state governments. . .. "" Finally,
the Court appeared to come full circle when it ruled in Wickard v.
Filburn' that Congress could regulate the home production and consumption of wheat.61 At this point, the early New Deal philosophy of state

51. Id. at 93. "[T]he Court reversed its pattern of economic activism, and did so
without any change in membership. The whole panoply of doctrinal instruments economic
due process, liberty of contract, dual federalism, the local nature of manufacturing, direct or
indirect effects on interstate commerce, all were abandoned in an orgy of reversal." Id.
52. Judicial restraint is characterized by the courts respecting the enactments of the
political branches of the government and being cautious about holding legislation
unconstitutional. See Maidment, supra note 15, at 118-119.
53. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54. Id. at 22.
55. Id.
56. See Thomas D. Dillard, United States v. Lopez: The Commerce Clause vs. State
Sovereignty, Once Again, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 158 (1996).
57. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
58. Id. at 118.

59. Id. at 124.

60. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
61. The Court developed the "aggregate effects" theory which stated that if an activity
taken in the aggregate had an effect on interstate commerce, it could be regulated. Thus, a
lone farmer could be regulated because when his actions were taken in the aggregate with
other farmers there could be an effect on interstate commerce. See Rachel Elizabeth Smith,
United States v. Lopez: Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power and Remembering
Federalism, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1459, 1476-77 (1996).
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sovereignty and dual federalism was abandoned and nearly total deference
was afforded to Congress. 62
II. MODERN CASES
A. THE FLUCTUATING DEFINITION OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT

It was nearly forty years before any substance was given to the Tenth
Amendment again. Its re-emergence, however, came in 1975 with the
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.63 In Usery the Court

invalidated amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which extended

minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to state employees.
Referring to the Tenth Amendment, the Court stated that it "expressly
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in
a fashion that impairs the States' integrity."' Further, the Court stated
that, "[tihere are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress. 6 5 With this revival of the
states' rights doctrine, the Tenth Amendment once again served as a
prohibition on Congress' ability to assert power over the states.66
The Usery doctrine of essential attributes of state sovereignty did not
endure the test of time. The doctrine began to. erode a few years later6 7
and was subsequently overturned in 1985 with Garcia v. San Antonio

62. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalismand the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 484 (1997) ("The consequence [of this change by the Court]
was that the states became constitutionally dependant on the will of Congress through the
latter's power of preemption and the operation of the Supremacy Clause. Arguably, this not
only radically changed the nature and balance of the federal system, but abolished federalism
as a matter of constitutional law.").
63. 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
64. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
65. Id. at 845. The Court also stated that "One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty
is the States' power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ
in order to carry out their governmental functions.
Id.
66. See Ching, supra note 21, at 111.
67. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyo., 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding an extension of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to cover state and local governments and ruling that this
was a valid exercise of Congress' power); FERC v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding
Federal Energy Regulation Commission standards and procedural requirements on state utility
commissions); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act which mandated performance
standards for surface mining operations).
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Metropolitan Transit Authority.68 In Garcia, the Court showed frustration
over the difficulty of defining those attributes of state sovereignty deemed
to be essential. 69 The Court abandoned the effort and reasoned that these
determinations need not be made by the courts because the states' interests
7
were already protected through the political process. " The Court rationalized that because the states send representatives to Congress, their interests
are being protected. 7 This theory was reinforced three years later when
the Court stated that, "[s]tates must find their protection from congressional
regulation through the national political process, not through judicially
defined spheres of unregulable state activity."72
B. SHIFT BACK TO STATES' RIGHTS

But for the temporary doctrine of Usery, the Court had not shown any
of the activism that was present in the early New Deal cases. Deference to
Congress essentially remained strong for nearly fifty years. In 1992,
73
however, with the Court's decision in New York v. United States, a new
era of states' rights may have begun. An examination of New York and the
later decided United States v. Lopez74 may reveal some clues as to whether
the 1997 decisions cement a new vision of federalism.
The issue in the New York case revolved around the Low Level
7
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. ' The Act provides
that states, either alone or in regional compacts, must provide for the
76 The Act offers three
disposal of waste generated within their borders.
77 The Court
incentives to the states for complying with this obligation.
78
held the third incentive to be beyond Congress' power to regulate. This
68. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The issue in Garcia was again the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority wanted immunity from the Act's minimum
wage and overtime pay provisions.
69. The Court stated that "the opinion [in Usery] did not explain what aspects of such
decisions made them [wages and hours of state employees] such an 'undoubted attribute'
and the Court since has remarked about the uncertain scope of the concept." Id. at 548.
70. "The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated." Id. at 556.
71. See Ching, supra note 21, at 114.
72. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
73. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
74. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
75. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021c (West 1985). Congress passed this Act in response to
a looming shortage of disposal sites for low level radioactive waste in thirty-one states. New
York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.
76. New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.
77. Id. at 152.
78. Id.
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incentive was referred to as the "take title" provision because it specified
that a state or regional compact that does not provide for the disposal of
waste by a particular date must take title to and possession of the waste.79
The state would become liable for damages suffered by the generator of the
waste as a result of the state's failure to promptly take possession.80
The arguments against the Act stated that Congress, rather than directly
regulating the waste generators, had unconstitutionally directed the states
what to regulate and how to regulate."' In response, the Court stated that
although Congress has the authority to pass laws requiring or prohibiting
certain acts, Congress may not compel the states to require or prohibit those
acts. 82 Congress "may not simply commandeer the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program." 3
The Court focused on accountability and refused to allow Congress to
skirt public disapproval of their actions by forcing state officials to
implement their directives.8 4 The Court reasoned that with the "take title"
provision of the Act, 5 Congress essentially forced the states to regulate
pursuant to its direction and crossed "the line distinguishing encouragement
from coercion."8 6 With this decision, the Court outlined a new definition
of state sovereignty, one in which the states cannot be compelled to
implement federal policy and one in which accountability is not allowed to
be clouded. 7 This notion of accountability as an element of states' rights

79. Id.at 153.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 161.
82. Id. at 166.

83. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981)).
84. "But where the Federal Government directs States to regulate, it may be state
officials who bear the brunt of public disapproval, while federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.
Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot
regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by
federal regulation." Id. at 169.
85. The Court held the first two provisions to be constitutional because they provided
incentives not directives. 505 U.S. at 171, 173.
86. Id. at 175-76.

87. See Jennifer A. Wiengleb, Strong-Arming the States to Conduct Background Checks
for Handgun Purchasers:An Analysis of State Autonomy, PoliticalAccountability, and the
Brady Handgun Violence PreventionAct, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 373, 380-81

(1995) ("Federalism creates a zone of autonomy, which the federal government should
respect in certain areas . . . 'Political accountability, a necessary feature of democratic
federalism, is the 'answerability' of representatives to the represented."' (quoting D. Bruce
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and federalism would reemerge in Printz v. United States,8 the 1997
decision invalidating portions of the Brady Handgun Act.
In 1995, when the Court announced its decision in United States v.
Lopez, 9 it again curtailed Congress' regulatory power. In Lopez, the Court
invalidated the Gun Free School Zones Act9° by stating that Congress did
not establish the requisite nexus between guns in schools and interstate
commerce. 9 With this decision, the Court ruled for the first time since the
New Deal that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers.
The Lopez Court refused to adopt the Wickard v. Filburn-type
aggregate effects philosophy 92 and stated that to uphold the act, "we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States."93 The Act had tried to
regulate the two traditionally state areas of crime and education. With this
decision, the Court reaffirmed its new found commitment to state autonomy
and its commitment to maintaining a federal-state balance. 94 The Garcia
notion of states finding protection solely within the federal political process
appeared to be a thing of the past.95
96
Arguably, the Court is returning to the activism of the early 1930s.
As the Court did then, the current Court appears to be looking beyond the
social and economic effects of its decisions and is concerning itself with
principles of state sovereignty. The New York and Lopez cases concerned
Congressional attempts to regulate matters that greatly affect society in the
1990s: radioactive waste and handgun violence. The Court rebuffed these
efforts at solving these problems and instead focused on notions of states'
rights and federalism. It has been suggested, however, that these concerns
with state sovereignty are a mask for the Court's frustration at the size and
La Pierre, PoliticalAccountability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to
JudicialReview of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. Rev. 577, 640 (1985)).
88. 117 S. Ct. at 2382.
89. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
90. The Gun Free School Zones Act made it a federal offense for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows or has reasonable cause
to believe is a school zone. See Id. at 551.
91. Id. at 562-63.
92. In Wickard v. Filburn,the Court upheld regulation of a local farmer's homegrown
wheat. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.

93.
94.
95.
96.

514 U.S. at 567.
See Smith, supra note 61, at 1497.
Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1995).
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The Court seemed to

solidify its opposition to the New Deal when it ruled in Carterthat the Bituminous Coal Act
of 1935 was an unconstitutional attempt at regulation by Congress.
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scope of Congressional power. 97 This frustration, real or not, seems to
reappear in the 1997 decisions. Again, Congress has attempted to address
problems that face the country9" and the Court has again turned to notions

of federalism. Whether the Court has legitimate concerns about Congress

over-reaching its constitutional bounds or whether the Court is simply
erecting philosophical barriers to the proposed solutions to today's problems

may be determined by examining the decisions from the 1997 Term.
III. DECISIONS IN 1997

In the history of our country, the Supreme Court has struck down only
141 laws. 99 In one week, however, during the 1997 Term, the Supreme
Court struck down three federal laws."° What follows is an examination
of those three decisions: United States v. Printz,'0 ' City of Boerne v.
Flores,"° and Reno v. ACLU. 3 At first glance, it appears that these
decisions outline a new federalism."° Indeed, when the Court invalidated
portions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 5 in Printz and
when it invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act"° in City of
Boerne, the Court clearly asserted its belief in increased state power.
However, the Court also invalidated the Communications Decency Act'0 7
in Reno v. ACLU by stating that Congress crossed the First Amendment line

97. See Caminker, supra note 7, at 1088 ("Beneath the surface of the Court's opinions
in New York and ... other recent federalism cases, lurks a discernable and genuine lament
about the tremendous expansion of congressional power since the Constitution's Founding,
coupled with an apparent frustration over what to do about it.").
98. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), concerned the regulation of
handguns through the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997), concerned Congress' attempt to regulate pornography on the Internet.
99. See Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, July 2, 1997) (Nina
Totenberg, NPR Reporter, interviewing David Strauss, editor of the Supreme Court Review
and Law Professor at the University of Chicago).
100. Id.
101. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). See supra note 2.
102. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). See supra note 3.
103. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). See supra note 4.
104. Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law professor, stated that "[t]he most consistent
commitment of the current court is probably a vision of federalism that gives states
considerably more autonomy and protection from the national legislature than any court in
decades has done," in John A. Farrell, In Session, A Streak of Pragmatism,BOSTON GLOBE,
June 28, 1997, at Al.
105. Pub. L. No. 103-159, Title I, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
106. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
107. Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
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by abridging free speech on the Internet. °8 Because the Reno decision
does not involve the states' rights question, the Court's rationale for striking
these three federal laws is not perfectly clear and concise. There is no
single, unified and easy answer for the Court's actions. Taken together,
these three decisions signal more than an increased recognition of state
autonomy. These decisions reveal a Court that is concerned with the
enlarged scope of federal power and is prepared to narrow that scope."
A. PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES

The Gun Control Act of 1968"' (hereinafter GCA) sets forth the
The Brady
federal scheme that governs the distribution of firearms.'
The
Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 amended the GCA."
Brady Act requires the Attorney General of the United States to establish a
national instant background check system for purchasers of handguns. It is
mandated that this system be in place by November 30, 1998.' '3 In the
interim, the Act provides that local chief law enforcement officers (hereinafter CLEOs) must make efforts to perform background checks on potential
handgun purchasers within five days of being notified by firearm dealers of
potential sales." 4
Jay Printz and Richard Mack are both CLEOs; Printz is the chief law
enforcement officer in Ravali County, Montana and Mack is the chief law
enforcement officer in Graham County, Arizona." 5 Both Printz and Mack
objected to this interim provision of the Brady Act and filed separate actions
challenging its constitutionality." 6 The argument put forth by Mack and
Printz against the Act's constitutionality focuses on the authority of
Congress to compel state officers to execute federal laws." 7 In both
cases, the district courts found the provision of the Act tobe unconstitution-

108. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2345 ("In order to deny minors access to
potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.").
109. See David Wagner, The Rehnquist High Court?, INSIGHT MAG., July 28, 1997, at
8 ("If there is a dominant theme in the court's recent cases, it is reining in the powers of
Congress.").
110. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
111. 117 S. Ct. at 2368. The Court outlines the scope of the Gun Control Act of 1968.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2369.
115. Id.
116. 117 S.Ct. at 2369.
117. Id.
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al."' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, combining the cases,

reversed the district courts and upheld the constitutionality of the Brady
Act's provisions." 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme
Court ruled that this interim provision of the Brady Act is an unconstitutional mandate by Congress."
Seeming to echo the Schechter Court that,
"[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power,
the Court stated that, "[t]he Constitution protects us from our own
best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns . . . so that we may
resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient
solution to the crisis of the day."''
In reaching its decision, the Court
admitted that there was no constitutional text that addressed the question at

hand.

3

In an opinion that hinged on somewhat subjective conceptions

of constitutional policy, 24 the Court looked to support its decision with

an examination of historical understanding, the structure of the Constitution

118. Id. Both Courts found that the provision that outlined this interim system was
severable from the rest of the Act. This allows a voluntary background check system to
operate until the National system is in place. Id. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp.
1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp.
1503 (D. Mont. 1994), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
119. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.
1995). The court referred to earlier decisions of the Supreme Court which allowed federal
regulation and intervention in state affairs and business. Id. The court stated that in Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Supreme Court
stated that the federal government could offer to preempt regulation in a given area and
permit the states to avoid preemption if they regulate in a manner acceptable to Congress.
Further, the court stated that in FERC v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742 (1982), the Supreme Court
permitted the federal government to require state utility regulators to consider prescribed
federal standards in determining regulatory policies. The court stated that, "[a]gainst this
background, there would appear to be nothing unusually jarring to our system of federalism
in the Brady Act's requirement." Mack, 66 F.3d at 1029.
120. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
.121. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 528. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
122. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 ("It matters not whether policymaking is involved...
such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty.").
123. Id. at 2370. The Court stated that, "there is no constitutional text speaking to this
precise question." Id.
124. David Strauss, Law Professor at the University of Chicago and the editor of the
Supreme Court Review, stated, "[ilt was really the Supreme Court saying, we think this
legislation is ill-considered; we think it goes too far; we don't think there's a very good
rationale for it, and we're gonna strike it down . . . [Tihere was no single provision of the
Constitution that they could point to. And there was also no well established body of judicial
doctrine that they could point to." Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, July
2, 1997).
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and past jurisprudence.' 25 However, much of the majority's opinion was
written in defense to the dissent. For each historical example and structural
interpretation, the dissent countered with an opposing interpretation. As a
result, Printz is an opinion that does not rest on solid constitutional ground.
It is an opinion based on a deep philosophical belief in state sovereignty that
is written to reach a predetermined end consistent with that belief.
To support its position, the majority first examined instances early in
our nation's history when state officials were asked to enforce federal
prescriptions.' 26 The Court presented a long list of statutes passed by an
early Congress in which state judges were asked to perform federal
functions. 27 These functions included such varied tasks as recording
applications for citizenship, transmitting abstracts of citizenship, registering
aliens seeking naturalization, issuing certificates of registry, resolving
controversies between a captain and a crew of his ship concerning the
seaworthiness of the vessel and hearing the claims of slave owners who had
In order to separate these early statutes
apprehended fugitive slaves.'
from the mandate of the Brady Act, the majority argued that the enlistment
of judges is distinct from the enlistment of state executives.'29 The
argument of the majority is that while it may have been constitutional to
enlist judges to perform federal duties, it is not constitutional to mandate
state executives to do so.
The dissent objected to the majority drawing this fine distinction
between adjudicative functions and executive functions with what it
characterized as "empty formalistic reasoning."' 30 The dissent further
attacked the majority's distinction of Congress being able to request state

125. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370.
126. Id.
127. Id. See Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 154-155 (Act mandating that
state courts maintain a registry of aliens seeking naturalization). See also Act of Mar. 26,
1790, ch. 3, § 1. 1 Stat. 103 (Act mandating state judges and clerks perform various duties
with respect to applications for citizenship).
128. See Caminker, supra note 7, at 1045, n.176 ("[T]wo centuries ago, state and local
judges and associated judicial personnel performed many of the functions today performed
by executive officers, including such varied tasks as laying city streets and ensuring the seaworthiness of vessels. Thus, these early commandeering statutes clearly represent executive
rather than judicial commandeering.").
129. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371. ("These early laws establish, at most, that the
Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges
to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate
for the judicial power.").
130. Id. at 2392.
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assistance but not being able to command it.' 3' In support of its argument, the dissent pointed to the example of President Wilson utilizing the
services of state officers to implement the World War II draft. 3 2 The
dissent argued that the fact that Wilson requested the help of the states
rather than commanded it reveals that he was an effective statesman but
does not mean that he could not have made the assistance mandatory had he
33
felt it necessary in that national emergency.
In its discussion of the historical uses of state judges and state
executive officials, the majority of the Court relied heavily on fine
distinctions such as the distinction between judges and state executives.
Further, the majority simply relied on the lack of precedent of commandeering of state officials into federal service to deny its constitutionality in this
case.'34 The dissent attacked the majority's reasoning and said the majority's arguments lacked affirmative support and were against the substantial
weight of the evidence in opposition. 35 The dissent stated that, "[a]bsent
even a modicum of textual foundation for its judicially crafted constitutional
rule, there should be a presumption that if the Framers had actually intended
1 36
such a rule, at least one of them would have mentioned it.
Undaunted by the dissent's completely opposite interpretation of
historical commandeering statutes, however, the majority of the Court next
built on its evidence by examining the structure of the Constitution and its
history.1 37 The majority stated with certainty that the Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty. 3 ' In the majority's view, that system
of dual sovereignty does not allow the federal government to issue mandates

131. Id. at 2393. The majority referenced passages from The Federalist Papers which
seem to say that the Federal government may enlist the states to execute federal laws, but
stated that, "none of these statements necessarily implies what is the critical point here that
Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent of the States. They appear
to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent to allowing their officials to
assist the Federal Government." Id. at 2372.
132. Id. at 2393.
133. Id.
134. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court outlines instances where state judges and
clerks were asked to perform federal functions. Although the dissent analogizes these early
statutes with the present situation, the majority refuses to concede that commandeering state
court officials into federal service is precedent for commandeering other state officials. The
majority states, "we do not think the early statutes imposing obligations on state courts imply
a power of Congress to impress the state executive into its service." Id.
135. Id. at 2394.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2376.
138. Id. ("It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of dual
sovereignty.").
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to state officials. To add weight to this interpretation, the majority looked
to the Founding Fathers by examining
the writings of Hamilton, Madison
139
and Jay in The Federalist Papers.
The majority, using The Federalist No. 15 as support, stated that, "the
Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them
that using the States as the instruments of federal governance was both
ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict.""
The Court
referred to Madison who stated that local and municipal authorities form
"distinct and independent portions of the supremacy" and are not subject
"within their respective spheres, to the general authority."''
This language, according to the majority, supports the proposition that the Framers
explicitly chose a Constitution that did not give Congress the power to
regulate the states. 42
The dissent, however, also turned to The Federalist Papers to rebut the
majority's interpretation of the Framers' intent. The dissent quoted
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 27 that the Constitution, "by
extending authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the
several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistrate
of each, in the execution of its laws."' 43 According to the dissent, this
unambiguous language stands for the proposition that the federal government
has the power to demand that local officials implement national policy
programs.'"
To explain the difference in interpretation of the Framers' intentions,
the dissent pointed out that the majority looked for evidence that the
national government actually exercised such power in the early years of our
139. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, (Clinton Rossiter
ed., NAL Penguin Inc. 1961). The editor states in his introduction to this edition that, "The
Federalist stands third only to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself
among all the sacred writings of American political history." Id. at vii. The Federalist
Papers were a series of essays written by "Publius" in reality Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison and John Jay and published in New York newspapers in an effort to gain support
for the proposed Constitution. See Id. at ix.
140. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377. The Court only references The Federalist No. 15 when
making this statement. The Court stated that "[w]e have set forth the historical record in
more detail elsewhere, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S., at 161-166." Id.
141. Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 39. See Hamilton supra note 139, at 245).
142. Id. The Court stated that, "the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers
upon the Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States." Id.
143. Id. at 2389.
144. Id. To bolster this point, the dissent again quoted Hamilton: "[T]he legislatures,
courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations
of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be
rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws." Id.
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country. 45 Because our history is bereft of such evidence, the majority
concluded that the Framers did not intend the federal government to have
such power.'6 In response to that logic, the dissent stated that following
such a position would undermine most of the post-New Deal Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.147 The dissent then quoted Justice O'Connor from
her New York v. United States opinion stating that, "[t]he [F]ederal
[G]overnment undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable
to the Framers."'"
The dissent found the answer to the constitutionality of the Brady Act
interim provision in the Necessary and Proper clause of Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution. 49 The clause states that Congress has the power,
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers."'" The dissent argued that the grant of
authority in the Necessary and Proper clause is adequate to support the
temporary enlistment of local police officers to run background checks.'
The dissent did not find that the Tenth Amendment' restricts this grant
of authority. The Tenth Amendment, according to the dissent, refers to
powers "not" delegated to Congress but it does not profess to limit the
exercise-of powers which are delegated to Congress.'
The majority addressed the dissent's argument and, at the same time,
reaffirmed its commitment to states' rights. The Court stated that, notwithstanding the Necessary and Proper clause, when a law violates the principle
of state sovereignty, it is not a law that is proper for executing the
Commerce Clause. 4 The Court found support in its New York deci-

145. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389.
146. Id. at 2370.
147. Id. at 2391. The dissent stated that, "we have never suggested that the failure of
the early Congresses to address the scope of federal power in a particular area or to exercise
a particular authority was an argument against its existence."
148. Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157).
149. Id.

150. U.S. CONST., art. I, §8; See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387.

151. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387. The dissent argued that "[t]he additional grant of
authority in that section of the Constitution... is surely adequate to support the temporary
enlistment of local police officers in the process of identifying persons who should not be
entrusted with the possession of handguns." Id.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
153. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387.
154. Id. at 2378.
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sion t5 in which it stated that Congress does not have the power to directly
compel the states to require or prohibit certain acts. 156
Having outlined its support for its decision with the examination of
historical precedent and of The Federalist Papers, the majority stated the
underlining rationale for its decision. That rationale is a belief that the
states have definite and separate powers that cannot be usurped by the
federal government.'5 7 It is this fundamental belief in state sovereignty
that defines this opinion. The majority stated that, "[iut is the very principle
of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no comparative
assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental
defect."'5 8 The Court echoed the rationale that was prevalent among the
early New Deal Court that crisis is not enough to enlarge the power of
Congress.'5 9 The majority stated that power should not be concentrated
in any one branch of government as a quick solution to the "crisis of the
day.''6 The Court declared that the Brady Act's interim provision is
"fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty.''
In examining this opinion, the majority's commitment to states' rights
is apparent. The notion of federalism that first emerged in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Usery1 is gaining strength .163 However, there
is something more in this opinion. There is no doubt that the Court is
cementing its vision of dual sovereignty. What is also happening here,
however, is the Court venting its frustration with the largess of the federal
Throughout this opinion, the Court often relied on the
government."
principles that were outlined in New York, 65 including the notion of the
need for Congress to have accountability for its actions. The Court stated
155. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
156. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378. ("[E]ven where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to
compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.").
157. Id. at 2381. ("It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they
remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.").
158. Id. at 2383.
159. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
160. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2383.
161. Id. at 2384.
162. Rehnquist wrote in Usery that the Tenth Amendment, "expressly declares the

constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity." 426 U.S. 833, 843 (1975).

163. See Herman Schwartz, The Nation Supreme Court Going Right by Using States

Rights, L.A. Times, October 5, 1997 at M2.
164. See Caminker, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
165. New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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that, "[b]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take
credit for solving problems without having to ask their constituents to pay
for the solutions with higher taxes. And even when the states are not forced
to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in
the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its
defects."'" This language indicates an underlying antagonism toward the
actions of Congress. This antagonism appears repeatedly throughout the
1997 decisions.
B. CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES

In City of Boerne v. Flores,67 the Court again illustrates antagonism
toward the actions of Congress. Also, the Court reaffirms its commitment
to states' rights. The case addresses the constitutionality of the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act'6s (hereinafter RFRA) and concerns the
St. Peter Catholic Church in the City of Boerne, Texas. St. Peter was built
in 1923 and replicates the mission style of architecture.169 The church,
which seats 230 people, is too small for its congregation. In order to
accommodate everyone, the church made plans for renovation and
expansion. 7 ' A few months after plans were underway to enlarge the
church, the City of Boerne passed an ordinance that mandated the Historic
Landmark Commission to preapprove construction affecting historic
landmarks or buildings in an historic district. 7 ' Because St. Peter was in
an historic district, the Commission chose to deny the church's application
for a building permit.' 72 The Archbishop of San Antonio brought suit
under RFRA 73 which prohibits government from burdening the free
exercise of religion with a law of general applicability.' 74 The City of
Boerne questioned the constitutionality of RFRA and the district court
concluded that Congress had exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment 75 power
166. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382.
167. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
168. Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
169. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
170. Id. Approximately forty to sixty parishioners cannot be accommodated at Sunday
mass.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
174. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 states that, "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
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in enacting the law. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and found
the Act to be constitutional. 76 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Congress passed RFRA in direct response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith."r In the Smith case, the Court considered a challenge
to an Oregon statute of general applicability that made use of the drug
peyote a criminal offense. 78 Members of a Native American church
objected to the law because they claimed it interfered with their free exercise
of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.'79 The practice of the church
members was to ingest peyote for sacramental purposes. 80 The Court did
not find the state law unconstitutional and ruled that neutral, generally
applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even without a
compelling state interest.'
Many members of Congress criticized the Smith decision and this
disagreement resulted in passage of RFRA. Congress stated that laws that
are neutral toward religion can nevertheless interfere with the exercise of
religious freedom.'82 Further, Congress stated that, "in [Smith], the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion."' 8'3 The stated purpose for RFRA was then, "to provide a claim
or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
Congress relied on its Fourteenth
government."' 8 4 To enact RFRA,
85
Amendment enforcement power.
The Supreme Court ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional. Following
a traditional federalist approach, the Court determined that Congress

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Section 5 states
that "[tihe Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."
176. City of Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2160. The Fifth Circuit court stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment does empower Congress to enact RFRA and that RFRA does not
usurp the judiciary's power to interpret the Constitution. See Flores v. City of Boeme, 73
F.3d 1352 (1996), aff'd 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
177. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
178. Id.

179. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").

180. City of Boeme, 117 S.Ct. at 2160.
181. Id.at 2161.
182. Id. at 2161 (quoting Congressional hearings and floor debates).
183. Id. (quoting Congressional hearings and floor debates).
184. Id. (quoting RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)).

185. See supra note 175.
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exceeded its power and intruded into traditional state areas." 6 The Court
looked at the scope of Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 87 According to the majority, Section 5 gives Congress the
power only to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8'
The Court has described this power as remedial.' 89 According to the
Court, RFRA was not remedial." 9
While admitting that "the line between measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the
governing law is not easy to discern," the Court nevertheless ruled that
Congress crossed that line when passing RFRA.' 9' Congress' stated
objective for RFRA was to prevent and remedy laws that are enacted with
the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs." 9 RFRA serves
to invalidate any law which imposes a substantial burden on religious
practice unless that law is justified by a compelling interest and is the least
restrictive means of accomplishing that interest."' The Court argued that
this type of preventive rule can sometimes be remedial. To be remedial,
however, there needs to be a congruence between the means used and the
ends to be achieved. 94
The Court stated that, "RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning."' 95 The problem
with the legislation, according to the Court, was that Congress did not
provide enough evidence of instances where general applicability laws were
passed for discriminatory reasons." 6 This lack of evidence of discrimination puts RFRA out of proportion to the proposed remedial ends."9 The
Court compared RFRA with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'98 When
186. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171. Declaring that RFRA is overbroad, the Court
stated that "[t]his is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate the health and welfare of their citizens." Id.

187. Id. at 2163. ("As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not

unlimited.").
188. Id.
189. Id. The Court quoted South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) to
illustrate that this power has previously been interpreted as "remedial."
190. Id.
191. City of Boeme, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.

192. Id.at 2168.
193. Id.at 2169.
194. Id.

195. Id.at 2170.
196. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
197. Id.at 2170.

198. Id. at 2169. The Court stated that, "[tihe constitutional propriety of [legislation
under the Enforcement Clause] must be judged with reference to the historical experience ...
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passing the Voting Rights Act, Congress had evidence of "subsisting and
pervasive discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional use of literacy
tests"'199 as voting requirements. In the case of RFRA, though, Congress
practices.200
did not have any such evidence of pervasive discriminatory
According to the Court, not only was RFRA passed despite little
evidence of the problem it is proposed to remedy but also is unconstitutionally overbroad. 2 ' RFRA applies to all levels of government federal, state
and local. The Court stated that under RFRA, "[a]ny law is subject to
challenge at any time by any individual who alleges a substantial burden on
his or her free exercise of religion." 2" Laws that are challenged would
2°a The Court feared that
have to pass a "compelling state interest" test.
2°4
many laws would not be able to pass such strict scrutiny.
When discussing the overbroad scope of RFRA, the Court put forth its
states' rights argument. 20 5 The Court stated that, "[t]he statute ... would
require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood
of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion upon the
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the
health and welfare of their citizens."2 '° RFRA curtails the "traditional
2°7 Additionally, the Court pointed
general regulatory power" of the states.
to the substantial cost of litigation that the states face defending challenges
to their laws under RFRA. 20 The Court noted that there are countless
state laws which impose a substantial burden on a large class of individu-

it reflects." (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). Id. at 2166,
2167.
199. Id. at 2167.
200. Id. at 2169. The Court stated, "RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of
modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." Id.
Further, the Court stated that "[t]he history of persecution in this country detailed in the
hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years." Id.
201. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2171. ("If an objector can show a substantial burden on his free exercise,
the State must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and show that the law is the
least restrictive means of furthering its interest. Claims that a law substantially burdens
someone's exercise of religion will often be difficult to contest.").
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. City of Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2171.

207. Id.

208. Id. RFRA has received a lot of press because of the cost to the states in defending
frivolous lawsuits brought by prison inmates claiming that their religious freedom had been
abridged. See Rossum, supra note 5.
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als. 209 The Court does not believe that persons whose religious beliefs
were incidentally burdened due to a law of general applicability were
burdened any more than other citizens. 20'
According to the Court, this
is the "reality of the modem regulatory state. ''2 '
This opinion is another clear reiteration of the majority's commitment

to federalism. The majority again has drawn a clear line between federal
and state power. According to this Court, congressional power is limited

and enumerated. 2 After making the argument that Congress had exceeded its power and had trampled on traditional state authority, the Court made

one last argument against RFRA. In the last argument, the majority's

antagonism toward the actions of Congress is seen.

The antagonism is evident when the Court essentially rebuffs Congress

for its attempt to overturn its decision in Smith.2 3 The Court stated,
"[w]hen the political branches.., act against the background of a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that
. . . the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them., 21 4 In
this case, Congress went beyond its authority. The precedent of the Smith
decision, according to the Court, "must control. 2 5 The Court believes

that Congress, by passing RFRA, essentially interpreted the Constitution. 2" This, according to the majority, is not the proper role for Congress. 211 The Court ruled that it is the province of the judicial branch to

209. Id. The Court makes reference to the particular zoning regulation at issue here.
210. Id. ("When the exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a
law of general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened
any more than other citizens ... .
211. Id.
212. See Steven G. Calabresi, A ConstitutionalRevolution, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1997
at A14.
213. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171. The Court stated that, "[o]ur national
experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the government
respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other
branches." Id. at 2172.
214. Id. at 2172.
215. Id.
216. Id. ("RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one before
us .... 1').
217. See Restoring the First Freedom, DEs MOINES REG., July 7, 1997 at 6 ("'Take
that, Supreme Court!' the lawmakers seemed to say. And the court replied by striking down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It is the job of the court, not the Congress, to say
what the Constitution means, the justices said.").
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say what the law is. 218 Arguably, the majority's view of its new federal-

ism embraces a separation of powers that assigns the role of ultimate
constitutional interpretation to the Court.219 This, according to some
scholars, is a view of judicial supremacy that "would have embarrassed even
John Marshall." 2
C. RENO V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union2 ' is not a case that is concemed with states' rights. In Reno, the Court addresses Congress' ability
222
to pass the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") as an effort to pro223 The CDA comprises
tect minors from harmful material on the Internet.
Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.224 The stated purpose of
the Telecommunications Act was to reduce regulation and encourage de225 Title V was the
velopment of new telecommunications technologies.
only title of the Act to be challenged.226 The two provisions of the CDA
transmission"
that were challenged were commonly known as the "indecent
227
provision and the "patently offensive display" provision.
Immediately after the President signed the Act, twenty plaintiffs filed
228
suit claiming that the two provisions of the CDA were unconstitutional.
218. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172. This notion was originally articulated in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Id. at 177.
219. The Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution was also articulated in the
early New Deal case of Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 296.
220. Wagner, supra note 109, quoting Robert George, professor of political science at
Princeton University and a former scholar-in-residence to Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
According to George, the Boerne decision goes beyond the precedent of Marbury which
states that it is the role of the judiciary to say what the law is.
221. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
222. Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
223. The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers which allows

people to communicate with one another in "cyberspace." See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct.
2329, 2334 (1997). The Court gives a detailed explanation of the beginning and the growth
of the Internet. Id.
224. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
225. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337, 2338. The major portions of the Telecommunications Act were designed to promote competition in the local telephone service market, the
multi-channel video market, and the market for over-the-air broadcasting. Id. at 2338.

226. Id.

227. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997) prohibits the knowing transmission of obscene
or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (Supp.
1997) prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a
manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age.
228. The plaintiffs ranged from the American Civil Liberties Union to the Queer
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A week later, a District Court judge issued a temporary restraining order
against enforcement of the provisions.229 Shortly thereafter, a three judge
panel on the District Court enjoined the government from enforcing the
provisions. 20 The Government appealed to the Supreme Court under the
Act's special review provisions.23'

Calling the breadth of the CDA's coverage "wholly unprecedent-

'
ed,"232
the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.233 The
problem with the Act, according to the Court, was its vague and over-broad
language. 2 4 The Court stated the words that Congress chose to use in the
act, such as "indecent" and "patently offensive," are general, undefined
terms which can cover large amounts of non-pornographic material.235
Material which has serious educational or other value would be banned.236
Further, the statute undeniably silences speakers whose messages should be
afforded First Amendment protection.237 The Court stated that this burden
on adult speech is unacceptable and an unconstitutional violation of free
speech.238
The vagueness of the CDA concerned the Court for two reasons. First,
because the CDA was a content-based regulation of speech it raised First
Amendment concerns.239 If a statute such as this has overly vague
language, it is difficult to know which speech is banned and which speech
is not banned. It is for this reason that a vague statute will have a chilling
effect on free speech. 24 People, uncertain as to what is illegal, will opt
for no speech at all. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. This increased

Resources Directory. A second suit was filed after the temporary restraining order was
issued. The two suits were consolidated. For a complete list of the plaintiffs, see Reno, 117
S. Ct. at 2339, nn. 27-28.
229. Id. at 2339.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2340.
232. Id. at 2347.
233. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
234. Id. at 2344.
235. Id. at 2347.
236. Id. at 2344. The Court questions whether, "a speaker could confidently assume
that a serious discussion about birth control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment
...or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA?" Id.
237. Id. at 2344. U.S. CONST. amend. I states that "congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech ...."
238. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. ("In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful
speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.").
239. Id. at 2344.
240. Id.
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deterrent effect, according to the Court, also has a chilling effect on free
speech. The severity of the possible criminal punishment, up to two years
in prison, could cause people to refrain from speech that may not be
prohibited by the CDA.24 '
Because these free speech concerns are so strong in this case, the Court
placed the heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive
provision would not have been as effective as the CDA. 24 2 The Court
stated that Congress could not sustain that burden. The CDA was not
narrowly tailored enough to survive the Court's scrutiny and was therefore
violative of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.243
This case differs from Printz and City of Boerne in that it does not
have a states' rights theme. The Court here is concerned primarily with the
scope of Congress' power and what the Court perceives as Congress'
propensity to pass over-broad, poorly thought-out legislation. 2" The Court
pointed out that the two provisions in question were added in executive
committee after the hearings on the Telecommunications Act were
completed and that no hearings were held prior to the passing of the
CDA.245 The Court quoted Senator Leahy, speaking at the one-day
hearing that was held after the adoption of the CDA by the Senate: "The
Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and never once had a hearing,
2
The
never once had a discussion other than an hour or so on the floor."
that
it
concluded
when
inquiry
Congressional
of
Court referred to this lack
247
the CDA was not drafted in sufficiently narrow terms.
Much like it did in Printz,2" the Court again echoed the view of the
early New Deal Court that valuable social plans are not to be afforded

241. Id. at 2345. ("The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to
remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.").
242. Id. at 2348.
243. Id. ("Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded
that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all.").
244. Id. at 2344. The Court argued that the vagueness of the CDA, "undermines the
likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting
minors from potentially harmful materials." ld.
245. Id. at 2338.
246. Id. at 2338, n. 24. After the Senate adopted the two statutory provisions challenged
in this case, the Senate Judiciary Committee did conduct a one-day hearing on "Cyberpom
and Children." Hearing on S. 892 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., Ist Sess., 7-8 (1995) (statement of Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senator from the state of
Vermont).
247. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
248. Printz, 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997).
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increased deference 24 9 The Court made reference to the important
purpose of the act, to protect children from exposure to sexually explicit
material, but stated that the importance of the purpose "does not foreclose

inquiry into its validity. ' 25

The Court reaffirmed its commitment to

making sure Congress has designed its statute in a way so that the purpose

is accomplished without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on

speech.25' In this case, as it did with its examination of the statutes at
question in Printz and City of Boerne, the Court refused to defer to the

judgment of Congress. According to the Court, Congress has a duty to

afford ample legislative attention to an Act and must not use language that
is vague and over-broad.2 52 The Court invalidated the law because

Congress failed its duty in this case.

IV. ANALYSIS
While it is unprecedented for the Supreme Court to invalidate three
federal laws in one week, it is even more so if these decisions signal a

fundamental shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence.253 If this is a new
federalism it is not a federalism that is concerned solely with state autonomy
and clear, delineated lines of state and federal power. There is more
reasoning to these decisions. Led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 25 these

249. The Court stated in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., that, "though we

should think that the measure embodies a valuable social plan and be in entire sympathy with
its purpose and intended results, if the provisions go beyond the boundaries of constitutional
power we must so declare." 295 U.S. 330, 346 (1935).
250. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
251. Id. at 2347.
252. Id. at 2347, n.41. The Court makes reference to an earlier case, Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). That case, like this case, involved a statute which
Congress gave little legislative attention to prior to passage. Quoting Sable, the Cotirt stated,
"aside from conclusory statements during the debates by proponents of the bill, as well as
similar assertions in hearings on a substantially identical bill the year before ...the
congressional record presented to us contains no evidence as to how effective or ineffective
the FCC's most recent regulations were or might prove to be .... No Congressman or

Senator purported to present a considered judgment with respect to how often or to what
extent minors could or would circumvent the rules and have access to dial-a-porn messages."
Id.

253. See Marcia Coyle, Was This Term Historic?, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B5.
The author states that, "[i]n the term that just ended, remarkable for the number of
pathbreaking issues confronting the justices, some court scholars are reluctant to attach the
"historic" label, but almost all agree that this term produced decisions with profound
significance for the structure of American government." Id.
254. Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority for these three decisions. See David
G. Savage, Supreme Court Grants States a Power Surge, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at Al.
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decisions illustrate a move by the conservative members of the Court to
curtail the regulatory power of the national government.255 This effort is
based on a strong belief in states' rights but, as these cases illustrate, it is
often driven by an antagonism toward the actions and the largess of
Congress.
The origins of this move by the Court to rein in the powers of
Congress can be found in the Usery decision in 1975.256 That decision,
written by Justice Rehnquist, overturned amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act which would have extended the Act's minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to employees of state governments.257 In
reaching its decision, the Court discussed essential attributes of state
sovereignty that were beyond the reach of Congress2 58 and the Court
warned of the national government "devour[ing] the essentials of state
sovereignty."25 9 Much as it did in the Prihtz case in 1997, the majority's
decision in Usery in 1975 rested largely on a philosophical belief in state
sovereignty and the dangers of a large and powerful Congress and not on
a specific provision of the Constitution. 6 The concerns of the dissent in
Usery are strikingly similar to those echoed by the dissent in the Printz
case.2 61 In Printz, the dissent was coricerned about what it called a
"judicially crafted constitutional rule."262 Likewise, over twenty years ago,
the dissent in Usery stated, "[m]y Brethren thus have today manufactured
an abstraction without substance, founded neither in the words of the
Constitution nor on precedent. 263 Perhaps because the majority's essential attributes theory was not founded on a strong constitutional basis, it did
not survive scrutiny. Usery was overturned by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.2 6

Discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist, Savage states that, "[i]n his view, the [Constitution]
leaves most government decisions to state legislatures, city councils and local boards, not to
Congress, federal agencies or judges." Id
255. See Schwartz supra note 163 and accompanying text.
256. See Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
257. 426 U.S. at 845. The Court stated that "there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 855.
260. See Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
261. See id. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2364.
263. Usery, 426 U.S. at 860.
264. See Garcia,469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Twenty-one years after Rehnquist voiced his concerns about the
national government devouring state sovereignty the Court is again revisiting
the question of the scope of federal power over the states. This concern
with limits and lines of authority noticeably began with the New York
decision in 1992,265 continued with Lopez" 6 and has been rooted firmly
into Constitutional jurisprudence with these 1997 decisions. In New York,
the Court limited Congress' power to regulate nuclear waste. 67 In Lopez,
the Court did the same with gun control. 2 Likewise the Court in Printz,
City of Boerne, and Reno limited Congress' power to regulate gun control,
religious freedom and the Internet.
The majority's concerns with the scope of federal power manifests
itself in a number of ways in these decisions. First, the commitment to
states' rights is apparent. 269 These concerns are clearly articulated in both
Printz and City of Boerne. Referring to the Brady Act's provision for
handgun background checks, the Court states that it is "fundamentally
incompatible" with our system of dual sovereignty.270
Similarly, in
response to RFRA, the Court calls it a "considerable intrusion into the
States' traditional prerogatives., 27' The Court appears to be resurrecting
the notion that there are essential attributes of state sovereignty that cannot
be usurped by Congress. Indeed, other decisions in the 1997 Term,
although not invalidating acts of Congress, did reinforce state power.272
In addition to its concerns about state sovereignty, the majority also
expressed uneasiness with Congress enlarging the scope of its power in
response to a perceived crisis or national problem. Echoing the early New
Deal Court, this Court does not see any reason why the powers of the
265. See New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

266. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
267. New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
268. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

269. See John Aloysius Farrell, Pragmatism, High-profile Cases Constitutional

'Common Sense' is Applauded, RICHMoND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 29, 1997, at A12.

(quoting Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law Professor, "The court has clearly reaffirmed and
underscored the depth of its constitutional commitment to states' rights. The most consistent

commitment of the current court is probably to a vision of federalism that gives states
considerably more autonomy and protection from the national legislature than any court in
decades has done.").
270. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
271. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
272. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). The Court upheld a state
"sexual predator" law which served to indefinitely confine prisoners who were convicted of
sexual crimes if they are believed to be "mentally abnormal." See also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). The Court ruled that states could pass legislation that

would criminalize doctor-assisted suicide.
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federal government should be enlarged to remedy a crisis or address a
unique problem.273 The early New Deal Court was considered activist
because it put its belief in dual federalism and states' rights over the social
or economic effects of its decisions. 74 The same can be argued for this
majority. In the Reno decision, the Court admitted that protecting children
from pornography on the Internet was important. However, the Court was
unequivocal in stating that this important purpose does warrant blanket
deference to Congress.273 Similarly, in Printz, while admitting that gun
control is an important objective, the Court stated that it must "resist the
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to
'
the crisis of the day."276
The Court is concerned also with Congress not being accountable for
2
its actions. In Printz, the Court stressed this need for accountability. "
The Court did not like the fact that Congress could insulate itself from
criticism by essentially delegating the dirty work to the state governments.278 The cost of performing background checks was borne by local
law enforcement as was the blame for problems and defects of the
system.2 79 This concern was first voiced in New York when the Court
stated that Congress should not be allowed to avoid public disapproval by
forcing state governments to implement its directives.280
The Court, beginning with New York and continuing with these
decisions, is attempting to rein in the power of Congress. The concerns of
the majority, which include state autonomy, quick legislative fixes for
problems, and the need for accountability, combine to form a movement by
the Court to curtail the regulatory power of Congress. Although the concern
for states' rights is a dominant theme, it is certainly not the sole reason for
the Court's decisions. This is a majority that is frustrated with the

273. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 528.
274. See Novak, supra note 35, at 92 ("'he bulk of the Court's activism had been
exhausted upon the national government's regulatory legislation, and often the rationale for
those decisions had been a professed solicitude for the sovereignty of the states.").
275. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
276. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383. ("Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting
forth the form of our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures
deviating from that form. The result may appear 'formalistic' in a given case to partisans
of the measure at issue, because such measures are typically the product of the era's

perceived necessity.").
277. See id.at 2382. The Court criticized Congress for taking credit for solving
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher taxes.
278. Id.
279. Id.

280. See New York, 505 U.S. 149 (1992).
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" ' Its decisions are fueled less
expanding scope of congressional power.28
by strict readings of the Constitution than by philosophical beliefs and
frustration. Indeed in Printz, for example, the Court admitted that the text
of the Constitution did not address the issue. Nevertheless, the Court found
reasons to declare the interim provision of the Brady Act unconstitutional.
The Court has legitimate concerns about Congress passing legislation
without giving serious thought about the implications or without serious
thought about states' rights.282 Americans clamor for solutions to today's
problems and politicians fear losing elections if those solutions do not come
quickly enough. Often quick-fix legislation is poorly thought-out. 283 With
these decisions, the Court has gone beyond the role of acting as a check on
Congressional impulsiveness. To an extent, the Court has placed itself at a
level above that of the elected representatives in Congress. This situation
to our system of checks and balances and
can only bring problems
28 4
separation of powers.
Walter Dellinger, the Acting Solicitor General of the United States,
stated that with these decisions the Court shifted away from deferring to the
judgment of "the elected representatives of the people in Congress" and "has
made its own judgment as its best reading of the Constitution. 2 5 This
situation is likely to create problems.28 6 Congress' ability to govern will
be undermined by the Court declaring itself the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution and the ultimate decider of regulatory policy. The Court has
erected barriers that will impede Congress' ability to regulate. For instance,
can Congress mandate that a registry of missing children be compiled with
input from the states? Following the Printz rationale, the answer is probably

281. See Caminker supra note 7, at 1088, stating that, "[Wust beneath the surface of the
Court's opinions in New York... and other recent federalism cases, lurks a discernible and
genuine lament about the tremendous expansion of congressional power since the
Constitution's Founding, coupled with an apparent frustration over what to do about it."
282. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. Senator Leahy referred to Congress
passing the CDA as going in "willy-nilly" and never once having a hearing.
283. See supra note 252.
284. Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the
City of Boerne case "has serious implications for the balance of power between the court and
the Congress." See Morning Edition, supra note 99 (interview with Orrin Hatch).
285. Weekend Edition - Saturday (National Public Radio Broadcast, June 28, 1997)
(interview by Nina Totenberg, NPR Reporter, with Walter Dellinger).
286. Bruce Ackerman of Yale Law School stated that "[t]his very thin majority is, on
its volition and under its own steam, trying to challenge the bedrock elements of everybody's
idea of American government. A very rare event in American history." Morning Edition,
supra note 99 (interview with Bruce Akerman).
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no.2" 7 Congress' ability to address national problems will be hampered as
a result of these decisions. The ramifications of the 1997 Term may not be
readily apparent but will certainly shape future Congressional action.
V. CONCLUSION

The new federalism envisioned by the majority is a commitment to
states' rights coupled with close scrutiny of Congressional regulations. This
change in jurisprudence will undoubtedly affect the everyday lives of
Americans. Relying on the New York decision, lower courts have already
struck down laws that concern lead contamination and excessive timber exports. 8 Further, challenges to the "Motor Voter" law, the Clean Air Act,
and the Child Support Recovery Act are being litigated. 28 9 And following
its states' rights commitment, in the 1997 Term, the Supreme Court upheld
a state's restrictive sexual predator law and paved the way for the states to
outlaw assisted suicide.2 °
Issues such as the fate of affirmative action are already being affected
" ' The 1998 Term was
by the Court's increased deference to the states.29
to include an affirmative action case, Piscataway Township Board of
Education v. Taxman.2' Civil rights groups contributed to a settlement
that ended the case before it reached the Court fearing that the Court would
rule in a way that would essentially destroy affirmative action. 293 That
these groups would take the unprecedented step of settling such a high
profile case out of fear of how the Supreme Court might rule underscores
the profound impact of the 1997 Term.

287. See Weekend Edition - Saturday (National Public Radio Broadcast, June 28, 1997)

(Scott Simon, NPR Reporter and Daniel Schorr, NPR Senior News Analyst).
288. See Schwartz supra note 163 and accompanying text.

289. Id.

290. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
291. See Schwartz supra note 162 and accompanying text. (discussing the case of
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (1996)).
292. Piscataway,cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1997) (No. 96-679). This
case concerns a white school teacher being fired over a black school teacher in order to
preserve the school's diversity. See Nat Hentoff, Escaping From The Supreme Court,
VILLAGE VOICE, December 30, 1997 at 22.

293. See id. The civil rights groups included the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National Urban League and the Legal
Defense and Education Fund. A total of $433,500 was paid to Sharon Taxman for back pay,
damages and lawyers' fees.
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The Court has positioned itself to make sweeping decisions that affect
the lives of all Americans. After Roosevelt's "Court Packing Plan,''294 this
country experienced fifty years of largely uncontested regulation by the
federal government over innumerable aspects of daily life. Just as the
United States was changed by that shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
country will be changed by this new federalism. The line between state and
federal regulatory power is now more clearly drawn. Congress no longer
can pass regulations and rely on deference to its judgment by the Court.
This new federalism essentially ties the hands of the Congress. As the
American public looks for federal solutions to problems that face large
segments of the society, Congress will not be able to respond with sweeping
legislation. The new federalism is built on the political ideology of the
conservative majority of the Court rather than being founded on strong
constitutional policy. Because the majority of the Court did not rely on
strong constitutional precedent when it invalidated the laws at issue in
Printz, Reno and City of Boerne, acceptable areas of Congressional
regulation are no longer clearly defined. There are likely to be more
attempts by Congress to pass sweeping regulation - for example, a national
sexual predator registry or a national system designed to track persons who
are delinquent in child support payments. Following the 1997 decisions, the
success of these types of programs is unlikely. By sticking to an
unbendable notion of federalism, the Court is sure to hinder many worthwhile efforts to improve American society.
MELANIE

K. ST. CLAIR

294. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. The Court abandoned its "activist"
stance and began deferring to the judgment of Congress.

